Navegando por Autor "BANNELL, Ralph Ings"

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    Ontologia, racionalidade e a prática de valores
    (2008) BANNELL, Ralph Ings
    Is it possible to defend ethics without ontology? I argue not, but I don't advocate a metaphysical ontology, neither a reductionist nor an eliminationist one. On the basis of the social dependence of values ​​defended by Joseph Raz, that is, that values ​​exist insofar as they are supported by social practices, I criticize elements of this theory, specifically the idea that the validity of values ​​is independent of their social dependence. However, I do not propose a relativism of values, arguing that it is possible to maintain the pluralism of values ​​while also maintaining the possibility of validating them rationally, but in a way different from Raz's. I do this through a reconstruction of Habermas' analysis of the connection between the existence of values ​​and their validity, a connection established by the mutual dependence between language and the social world. Thus, the social dependence on values ​​is secured by linguistic communication practices, as well as their validity (or not). However, contrary to Habermas, I do not see why values, analyzed in this way, cannot appear as part of a social ontology, specifically the constraining force of that ontology in relation to the practices of individuals. I end with some reflections on this analysis and educational practice.
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    Resgatando a racionalidade na pesquisa educaional
    (2007) BANNELL, Ralph Ings
    This article discusses a philosophical question central to the human scienses and, thefore, to research in education, that is: Is it possible to recue a notion of rational interpretation given the actual lack of confidence, in some visions of contemporary thought, in the western epistemological tradition and its model of rationality? I give an affirmative asnwer to this question, while rejecting metaphusical conceptions of truth and rationality, arguing that the concepts of truth and rationality are essential for scientific research. I defend the possibility of valid, altthough fallibe, knowledge in the human sciences and a conception of rationality that is socially and historically situated. The principal objective of the text is to offer elements for a philosophy of educational inquiri that accepts the "linguistic turn" in philosophy and the human sciences but rejects the sceptism and/or contextualism frequently associated with this turn.