A epistemologia pragmatista de John Dewey: uma filosofia da experiência
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Tipo
Artigo
Classficação
Nível teórico
Data
2022
Autores
Título do Períodico
Filosofia e Educação
ISSN
1984-9605
Página(s)/e-location
119–144
Idioma(s)
pt, en
Fonte
Fonte
Campinas, SP
14
2
set.
14
2
set.
Coleções
Resumo
Dewey desenvolveu um programa doutrinário que visa mostrar como o conhecimento se funda na experiência. Essa é a dimensão científico-naturalista da sua obra. Nesse sentido, o seu projeto consiste numa rigorosa argumentação contra as explicações em que a experiência e a natureza são apresentadas com base em distinções arbitrárias. Na obra, Reconstruction in Philosophy [Reconstrução em Filosofia], Dewey desenvolveu seu projeto metafísico de dimensão historicista, propondo uma reconstrução para a filosofia. Em Experience and Nature [Experiência e Natureza], ele apresentou uma visada científica para a metafísica. Nessa obra, Dewey tenta pensar um sistema desenvolvido a partir da aplicação do método científico à filosofia tendo como base uma concepção filosófica da experiência. As concepções de Dewey acerca do conhecimento, do uso inteligente da razão e da natureza social da filosofia concorrem para a constituição de sua concepção de ciência. Nas duas obras fica evidente a sua crítica à noção tradicional de conhecimento como representação da realidade. Contra isso, Dewey passa a designar o conhecimento como um conjunto de “crenças” e “proposições” tomadas como garantias de usos ou assertividade garantida. Dewey se opõe à forma pela qual o problema epistemológico é formulado pela tradição, ou seja, a partir de uma posição realista ingênua no qual o conhecimento é visto como representação, desconsiderando o processo de conexão entre as coisas e entre o conhecedor e as coisas.
Dewey developed a doctrinal program that aims to show how knowledge is grounded in experience. This is the scientific-naturalist dimension of his work. In this sense, his project consists of a rigorous argument against explanations in which experience and nature are presented on the basis of arbitrary distinctions. In the work, Reconstruction in Philosophy, Dewey developed his metaphysical project with a historicist dimension, proposing a reconstruction for philosophy. In Experience and Nature, he presented a scientific approach to metaphysics. In this work, Dewey tries to think of a system developed from the application of the scientific method to philosophy based on a philosophical conception of experience. Dewey's conceptions about knowledge, the intelligent use of reason and the social nature of philosophy contribute to the constitution of his conception of science. In both works, his criticism of the traditional notion of knowledge as a representation of reality is evident. Against this, Dewey starts to designate knowledge as a set of “beliefs” and “propositions” taken as guarantees of uses or guaranteed assertiveness. Dewey opposes the way in which the epistemological problem is formulated by tradition, that is, from a naive realist position in which knowledge is seen as representation, disregarding the process of connection between things and between the knower and things.
Dewey developed a doctrinal program that aims to show how knowledge is grounded in experience. This is the scientific-naturalist dimension of his work. In this sense, his project consists of a rigorous argument against explanations in which experience and nature are presented on the basis of arbitrary distinctions. In the work, Reconstruction in Philosophy, Dewey developed his metaphysical project with a historicist dimension, proposing a reconstruction for philosophy. In Experience and Nature, he presented a scientific approach to metaphysics. In this work, Dewey tries to think of a system developed from the application of the scientific method to philosophy based on a philosophical conception of experience. Dewey's conceptions about knowledge, the intelligent use of reason and the social nature of philosophy contribute to the constitution of his conception of science. In both works, his criticism of the traditional notion of knowledge as a representation of reality is evident. Against this, Dewey starts to designate knowledge as a set of “beliefs” and “propositions” taken as guarantees of uses or guaranteed assertiveness. Dewey opposes the way in which the epistemological problem is formulated by tradition, that is, from a naive realist position in which knowledge is seen as representation, disregarding the process of connection between things and between the knower and things.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Epistemologia, Filosofia, Experiência, Epistemology, Philosophy, Experience
Citação
NASCIMENTO, Edna Maria Magalhães. A epistemologia pragmatista de John Dewey: uma filosofia da experiência. Filosofia e Educação. Campinas, SP, v. 14, n. 2, p. 119–144, set. 2022. 10.20396/rfe.v14i2.8668377. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/rfe/article/view/8668377. Acesso em: 2024-05-13